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Case No. 20050112-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
John Edwards, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a clandestine drug 
laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 and -
5(d)-(f) (Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was defendant's Fourth Amendment rights violated when the confidential 
informant entered defendant's home at defendant's invitation. 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual 
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-def erentially for correctness, including its application 
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 699. 
2. Was the search warrant supported by probable cause? 
Standard of Review. Same as Issue 1. 
3. Did the confidential informant's actions entrap defendant into 
manufacturing methamphetamine as a matter of law where defendant was already 
manufacturing methamphetamine when he met the confidential informant? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's entrapment determination "presents a 
mixed question of fact and law." State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, f 7, - Utah 
Adv. Rep. —. "Although [the Court] review[s] factual findings for clear error and 
legal conclusions for correctness, due to the factually sensitive nature of entrapment 
cases [it] will affirm the trial court's decision 'unless [it] can hold, based on the given 
facts, that reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether entrapment occurred/" Id. 
(quoting State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1995)). "Only when reasonable 
minds could not differ can [the Court] find entrapment as a matter of law." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const., amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Section 76-2-303, Utah Code, is also relevant to this appeal. The pertinent portions 
of that statute are set forth in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
After police searched his residence pursuant to a warrant, defendant was 
charged with possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine in the presence of a minor, endangerment of a child, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-3. Defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from his home, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and through unlawful entrapment. R. 134-64. Following a 
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 184-86,250-53. Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the clandestine 
laboratory offense, reserving the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. R. 238-46. The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of five years to 
life and defendant timely appealed. R. 266-69, 272. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the appeal to this Court. R. 274. 
Summary of Facts 
During his parole, James Michael Maddocks was conducting drug buys for 
the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force. SH: 39-41. He had successfully 
made a few drug buys for the Task Force during that time. SH: 41. At some point 
during his parole, Maddocks tested positive for drugs —a violation of his parole 
agreement. SH: 9,18,41. To avoid revocation of parole, he agreed that "he would 
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do what he could to get several more buys done or do something greater/7 such as 
produce someone who was manufacturing methamphetamine. SH: 9, 41-42. He 
initially agreed to help bring about the arrest of a woman suspected of 
manufacturing methamphetamine, but abandoned that effort when he found that 
he could not get near her. SH: 9. 
Maddocks subsequently met defendant through a mutual friend. SH: 8,10. 
At that first encounter, defendant was both smoking methamphetamine and 
handing it out to others. SH: 32. Based on his own experiences and his 
conversations with defendant, Maddocks suspected that defendant was 
manufacturing methamphetamine. SH: 11. Maddocks decided to "target" 
defendant by "step[ping] into his world." SH: 11. After meeting with defendant a 
second time, Maddocks notified Sgt. Keith Millett of the Task Force of his 
suspicions. SH: 33-34. He told Sgt. Millett that he "met a guy (defendant) dabbling 
in meth," that he was "selling it," and "smoking it," and that he suspected that he 
was manufacturing it as well. SH: 42. He told Sgt. Millett that he would follow up 
on his suspicions and report his progress. SH: 42. 
During the course of the next several weeks, Maddocks gained the trust of 
defendant. He did this in part by providing defendant with glass tubing used to 
smoke methamphetamine. SH: 11-12,17. Defendant invited Maddocks into his 
home some fifteen to twenty times during the course of their association. SH: 14,18-
19. Maddocks observed a meth lab in defendant's home during his first visit. SH: 
15. At some point, Maddocks provided defendant with some iodine — an ingredient 
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used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. SH: 12, 17, 43. That iodine, 
however, proved useless so defendant and Maddocks went to Wal-Mart and 
purchased small bottles of iodine. SH: 30-31. 
After Maddocks gained entry into defendant's "world/ ' he notified the Task 
Force that he had confirmed his suspicions. SH: 42. At one point, Maddocks 
discussed with Sgt. Millett his desire to provide defendant with iodine. SH: 16,43. 
But Sgt. Millett told him not to do so because they could not allow it to be used in a 
"cook/' SH: 17,43. Sgt. Millett was never told that Maddocks did so anyway, nor 
was he aware that Maddocks had also provided defendant with glass tubing to 
smoke methamphetamine. SH: 12-13,17. Both Maddocks and Sgt. Millett testified 
that at no time did the Task Force direct him to enter defendant's home or otherwise 
direct his actions. SH: 20,34, 45. 
On April 7, 2004, Maddocks went to defendant's house and witnessed 
defendant cooking methamphetamine. SH: 21. He thereafter left defendant's house 
and notified Sgt. Millett. SH: 21-22,46. Sgt. Millett secured a search warrant some 
four hours later and executed a search of defendant's home. SH: 23,46. The Task 
Force found defendant operating a meth lab in his home and in the presence of his 
child. SH: 46. Maddocks testified that he never asked defendant to manufacture 
methamphetamine for him. SH: 23-24. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Confidential Informant's Activity in Defendant's Home. Defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when Maddocks entered his home. 
First, no Fourth Amendment interests were implicated because Maddocks was not 
an agent of the police. Second, even if Maddocks was an agent, defendant invited 
him into the home. The law is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. 
II. Probable Cause for the Search Warrant. Contrary to defendant's claim, the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that the information provided by 
Maddocks and set forth in the search warrant affidavit was reliable. It was detailed 
and based on personal observation. It was consistent with the officer's extensive 
experience and training in detecting methamphetamine operations. And it came 
from an informant who had proved reliable in the past. 
III. Entrapment Claim. Nor was defendant entrapped as a matter of law. In 
the first place, Maddocks was not acting as a police agent. And in any event, 
Maddocks did not in any way exploit his mutual association with defendant to 
induce him into manufacturing methamphetamine. Nor did he so induce him by 
providing iodine that ultimately proved useless. Maddocks did not make persistent 
pleas for defendant to manufacture methamphetamine for him. Nor did he appeal 
to pity or sympathy. Moreover, defendant cannot prevail on a claim of entrapment 
where he was already engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant makes three claims on appeal. First, he claims that Maddocks's 
entry into his residence constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 12-23. Second, he claims that the search warrant was not 
supported by probable cause. Aplt. Brf. at 23-31. And third, he claims that he was 
entrapped as a matter of law. Aplt. Brf. at 31-37. All three claims fail. 
I. 
The Confidential Informant's Entry Into Defendant's Residence 
Did Not Implicate the Fourth Amendment 
Defendant argues that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant 
should have been suppressed because the warrant was based on information 
obtained by James Maddocks in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 
12-23. Specifically, defendant argues that as a confidential informant, Maddocks 
was an agent of the police and he thus violated the Fourth Amendment when he 
entered defendant's home without a warrant. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. 
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because Maddocks was not acting as an 
agent of the police. The law is well settled that the Fourth Amendment proscribes 
only governmental action. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). It "does not 
extend to the independent acts of private citizens/7 as was the case here. State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,1220 (Utah 1988). Although the Task Force was aware that 
Maddocks was trying to gain defendant's trust and obtain information that would 
incriminate him, it did not direct or exercise control over defendant's activities in 
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the home. See SH: 12-13,16-17,43. Moreover, it was clear that defendant was acting 
in his own self-interest—to avoid prosecution of the parole violation. Therefore, 
under State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), Maddocks was not acting as an 
agent of the police. 
Defendant suggests that the Task Force directed Maddocks to target him, that 
the Task Force provided defendant with an essential methamphetamine precursor 
through Maddocks, and that the Task Force exploited the mutual affiliation shared 
by defendant and Maddocks in inducing defendant to set up a clandestine drug lab. 
Aplt. Brf. at 17. These assertions are void of record support. The evidence 
established that the Task Force was not aware of defendant before Maddocks told 
them about him, let alone that he belonged to the same white supremacist group as 
Maddocks. SH: 42. The evidence also established that Maddocks secured the 
methamphetamine precursor independent of the Task Force, SH: 12-13, 17, 43. 
Indeed, defendant as much as admits on appeal that Maddocks was not an agent, 
conceding that Maddocks "was not supervised or acting under the control or 
direction of the task force." Aplt. Brf. at 30. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Maddocks was acting as an agent of the police, he 
did nothing that violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. This case is 
governed by Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), and State v. McArthur, 2000 
UT App 23, 996 P.2d 555, cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2002). 
In Hoffa, a Teamster's Union official under federal indictment made numerous 
visits over a four-week period to the hotel suite of Jimmy Hoffa during Hoffa's 
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criminal trial for violating the Taft-Hartley Act. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296,87 S.Ct. at 410. 
During these visits, Hoffa discussed with the union official and other associates his 
plans to bribe jurors. Id. Unbeknownst to Hoffa, and pursuant to a previous 
agreement with federal authorities, the union official regularly reported these 
conversations to federal agents. Id. at 296, 298,87 S.Ct. at 410-11. In exchange for 
his disclosures, federal charges previously filed against the union official were either 
dropped or not actively pursued. Id. at 298, 87 S.Ct. at 411. Based in large part on 
the information provided by the union official, Hoffa was charged and convicted of 
bribery. Id. at 296, 87 S.Ct. at 410. 
On certiorari, Hoffa argued that" deceptively placing a secret informer in [his] 
quarters and councils" violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 295. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the argument. The Court acknowledged that "the 
Fourth Amendment protects . . . the security a man relies upon when he places 
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his 
office, his hotel room or his automobile." Id. at 301. But the Court explained that 
the risk of being betrayed by an informant "'is the kind of risk we necessarily 
assume whenever we speak/" Id. at 303 (citation omitted). The Court thus held that 
no Fourth Amendment right was violated in the case because "the Fourth 
Amendment [does not] protect[ ] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id. at 301-02. 
In McArthur, the defendant's on again-off again girlfriend was picked up by 
police for forging checks stolen in a home burglary three months earlier. McArthur, 
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2000 UT App 23, % 2. She told the investigating officer that defendant committed 
the burglary and provided a detailed description of the burglary and the stolen 
items. Id. at ^ 2, 4. She told the officer that some of the stolen property was in 
defendant's mother's home, where defendant lived, and offered to retrieve it. Id. at 
f 5. Although defendant's girlfriend no longer lived with defendant, she stayed 
there periodically, kept some belongings there, and was always welcome. Id. at f^ 3. 
Agreeing to her offer, the officer drove defendant's girlfriend to defendant's house. 
Id. at Iffl 5-6. She entered the home, found defendant and his niece there, gathered 
some belongings, took two stolen items, and returned to the patrol car. Id. at f f 6-7. 
Relying on Hoffa, the Court in McArthur rejected the defendant's claim that his 
girlfriend's actions violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court recognized that 
"[t]he Constitution tolerates undercover investigations by informants who conceal 
their status as police agents." Id. at If 20. The Court explained that "'a privacy 
interest, in the constitutional lexicon, consists of a reasonable expectation that 
uninvited and unauthorized persons will not intrude into a particular area.'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). On the other 
hand, the Court held, "the Fourth Amendment has no application to the actions of 
invited and authorized persons, even when, unbeknownst to the unwary, they are 
acting as police agents." Id. 
Like the defendants in Hoffa and McArthur, defendant welcomed an informant 
into his home and thus assumed the risk of being betrayed by that informant. SH: 
14, 21. Having assumed that risk, he can claim no Fourth Amendment violation. 
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Just as Jimmy Hoff a did "not rely [ ] on the security of his hotel suite when he 
made the incriminating statements" in the presence of the informant, defendant 
here did not rely on the security of his home when he exposed his illegal activities to 
Maddocks. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. Maddocks "did not enter the [home] by force or 
by stealth." See id. "He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper." See id. He was in 
the home "by invitation" and defendant knowingly exposed to Maddocks his 
criminal activity therein. See id.; SH: 18-19. Defendant, therefore, "was not relying 
on the security of the [home], but "upon his misplaced confidence that [Maddocks] 
would not reveal his wrongdoing." See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that Maddocks could not enter defendant's 
home because under State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991), "the 
government cannot use informants to do for them what they cannot legally do 
themselves." Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. But as explained in McArthur, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment permits [an officer] to have [a confidential informant] do whatever he 
could do if he were [the confidential informant], i.e., if he had the run of the house." 
McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, % 20 n.4. As in McArthur, defendant "welcomed [the 
confidential informant] into his private sphere and candidly exposed to [him] the 
fruits of his illegal activity." Id. at | 21. Accordingly, [t]he risk that [Maddocks] 
would choose to cooperate with authorities and reveal what [he] saw and heard was 
borne by defendant alone." Id. Under these circumstances, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment offers no protection from the consequences of defendant's misplaced 
trust." Id. 
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In summary, defendant's conduct was "'inconsistent with an expectation of 
privacy'" in the home and "'operate[d] to neutralize his protected interest therein/" 
Id. at Tf 18 (quoting Lyons, 706 F.2d at 328). Because he knowingly exposed his 
illegal activity to Maddocks, that activity '"is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. , , , Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347). 
II. 
The Search Warrant Was Supported By Probable Cause. 
Defendant next argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable 
cause. Aplt. Brf. at 23-31. Specifically, defendant contends that "[t]here is not stated 
in the affidavit any information suggesting that the information provided by 
[Maddocks] was corroborated through an independent source or that the 
information was corroborated through observation or surveillance by the task 
force/' Aplt. Brf. at 25. Defendant also asks the Court to discount the affiant's 
statement that Maddocks had previously provided information that led to an arrest, 
claiming that it proved to be false. Aplt. Brf. at 25. This argument also fails. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United States Supreme Court 
explained that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit. . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place/' Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The Court recognized that an 
informant's reliability and basis of knowledge are relevant factors in the analysis, 
but explained that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the 
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overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other 
indicia of reliability/7 Id. at 233. 
Moreover, in reviewing a magistrate's issuance of a warrant, the task of the 
appellate court does "not take the form of de novo review/' Id. at 236. Instead, "the 
duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial 
basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Id. at 238-39 (citation 
omitted). In other words, the reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the 
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at 236. The information in the 
affidavit easily satisfies this standard. 
As stated by defendant, the affidavit of probable cause in this case rested 
primarily on information provided by James Maddocks—referred to in the affidavit 
only as the "confidential informant" (CI). R. 28-23. The affidavit stated that the CI 
provided police with the following information: 
(1) the CI met defendant "through other known drug users and has 
known [defendant] for a couple of months," R. 26; 
(2) the CI built a relationship of trust with defendant through their 
mutual association in a white supremacist group known as the 
"Peckerwoods," R. 26-25; 
(3) the CI has viewed phosphorous, ephedrine, iodine, glassware, 
and other items that are consistent with the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, R. 25; 
(4) the CI has helped defendant "weigh and package the finished 
product, methamphetamine, for sale and distribution," R. 25; 
(5) at approximately 3:00 p.m. on the day the warrant was sought, 
he CI saw defendant mixing ephedrine, phosphorous, and iodine in a 
flask that was sitting on an electric burner, R. 25; 
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(6) the CI has observed that "it usually takes [defendant] about ten 
hours to cook a batch of methamphetamine/7 R. 25-24; and 
(7) the CI has observed that defendant uses the white shed behind 
his house to store chemicals used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, R. 24. 
The affidavit also provided information that supported a belief that the 
foregoing information was reliable. For example, the detailed description of 
defendant's methamphetamine operation was consistent with the affiant's training 
and experience. The affidavit established that the affiant was a trained and 
experienced officer in the detection and investigation of methamphetamine labs. R. 
27-26 ( | 1). The affiant then confirmed that the chemicals and lab equipment which 
the CI reported seeing at defendant's residence are consistent with that which are 
used to produce methamphetamine. R. 25 (f 6). The affiant confirmed that the 
"described actions [of defendant] are consistent of one in the process of producing 
methamphetamine." R. 25 (^ [ 6). And finally, the affiant confirmed that the CI's 
report that it took defendant about ten hours to cook methamphetamine was 
consistent with the affiant's experience that the process of producing 
methamphetamine, "depending upon the cooking method used, can take up to ten 
hours." R. 25 fl[ 6). 
In addition, the affidavit provided information that supported a belief that the 
CI was reliable. The affiant reported that the CI had "worked with the task force on 
previous occasions and ha[d] provided reliable information that led to the arrest of a 
particular suspect the task force had been monitoring." R. 26 (f 2). Specifically, the 
affiant explained that the CI "conducted two (2) 'controlled buys' wherein the 
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informant was wired with an electronic transmitting device and given task force 
money to complete the transactions." R. 26 (^ f 2). The affiant reported that the CI 
"arranged the transactions and then followed through under the surveillance and 
supervision of the task force agents." R. 26 (^ f 2). The affiant then confirmed that 
"[e]ach time the information provided by the informant proved reliable and 
methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect." R. 26 (f 2). 
Defendant claims that these assertions proved to be false. Aplt. Brf. at 25. To 
the contrary, testimony at the suppression hearing supported the affiant's 
assertions. 
In support of his claim that Maddocks had not previously provided 
information leading to an arrest, defendant points to Maddocks' failed efforts to 
help bring down a woman who was suspected of manufacturing metham-
phetamine. Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. It is true that Maddocks had initially agreed to work 
off his parole violation by helping police arrest the suspected woman and 
abandoned that effort when he found out "[tjhere was no way that [he] could get 
near" her. SH: 9-10. But that failure was not Maddocks's only dealing with the Task 
Force. Sgt. Millett testified that Maddocks had been helping the Task Force before 
Sgt. Millett joined the Task Force and "had purchased some methamphetamine from 
some other individuals prior to my arrival." SH: 41 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary 
to defendant's claim, the affiant's assertion that Maddocks had previously provided 
reliable information did not prove to be false. 
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Defendant also complains that the affidavit failed to disclose that Maddocks 
had violated the terms of his parole and had worked out an arrangement with the 
task force to keep from going back to prison." Aplt. Brf. at 30. Defendant did not 
make this argument below. See 164-44; SH: 58-69. The trial court, however, was 
bothered by the affidavit's failure to indicate "why the confidential informant was 
cooperating" and concluded that such information "may be helpful. . . to the court." 
SH: 83. The court nevertheless concluded that even had the information been made 
known to the court, it "would not have changed the court's position with regard to a 
finding of probable cause to conduct the search." SH: 84. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the omission of information in a search 
warrant affidavit will require suppression of the evidence only if the omitted fact 
"materially affects the finding of probable cause." State v. Nielsen,727 R2d 188,191 
(Utah 1986). The trial court properly concluded that probable cause is not lacking 
when the omitted information is considered. Indeed, notwithstanding the omission, 
the affidavit was sufficient to notify the magistrate that the CI's motives were 
suspect. Where the affidavit identified the informant as a "confidential informant, 
rather than a "citizen informant," the magistrate could fairly infer that the CI was 
involved in the criminal element and providing the information to gain some kind 
of favor from police, whether it was money or a deal in a criminal case. Confidential 
informants who conduct controlled buys and associate with those in the drug 
business as they conduct that business are rarely f ound among law-abiding citizens. 
Moreover, the magistrate was made aware that the CI was a member of the 
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Peckerwoods, a white supremacist group. R. 26-25 (^ 3). In other words, inclusion 
of the CI's purpose in providing the information would have added little, if 
anything, to the magistrate's analysis. 
* * * 
In sum, the magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that the 
information provided by Maddocks was reliable. It was detailed and based on 
personal observation. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 (holding that even if an informant's 
motives are suspect, "his explicit and detailed description of the alleged 
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles 
his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case"). It was consistent with 
the officer's extensive experience and training in detecting methamphetamine 
operations. See id. at 242 (observing that "an officer 'may rely upon information 
received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as 
the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the 
officer's knowledge'"). And it came from an informant who had proved reliable in 
the past. See State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1996) (concluding that 
informant's tip "was deemed to be reliable because th[e] informant had provided 
the police with reliable information in the past"). 
III. 
Defendant Was Not Entrapped as a Matter of Law. 
Finally, defendant argues that he was entrapped as a matter of law. Aplt. Brf. 
at 31-36. He claims that he was entrapped because Maddocks exploited his 
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relationship with defendant as a fellow member of the Peckerwoods and provided 
defendant with an essential ingredient (iodine), without which "there [was] no way 
that the Appellant could have manufactured [the] methamphetamine/ , Aplt. Brf. at 
32-35. This claim also fails. 
Utah's entrapment statute provides in relevant part as follows: 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution 
by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1) (1999). The entrapment statute, therefore, requires 
government action. As discussed above, defendant was not an agent of the State. 
Accordingly, he cannot prevail on a claim of entrapment. Assuming, arguendo, that 
defendant was an agent, his claim still fails. 
The entrapment statute requires an objective review that "focuses solely on 
the actions of the government, and not on the defendant's predisposition, to 
determine whether entrapment has occurred/' State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,3 (Utah 
App. 1995). Under this standard, "'the pivotal questions are: (1) "does the conduct 
of the government comport with a fair and honorable administration of justice," and 
(2) did the governmental conduct create a substantial risk that an average person 
would be induced to commit the crime defendant committed?" Id. (quoting State v. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted)). 
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In considering whether government action improperly induced criminal 
conduct or merely afforded the defendant the opportunity to commit an offense, 
this Court considers "the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction 
between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements of the 
agent." State v. Taylor, 599 R2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). This Court has identified 
several examples of what might constitute entrapment, "depending on an 
evaluation of the circumstances of each case": (1) "extreme pleas of desperate 
illness," (2) "appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal 
friendship," (3) "offers of inordinate sums of money," and (4) "excessive pressure or 
goading." State v. J.D.W., 910 P.2d 1242, 1243-44 (Utah App. 1995) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). The evidence at the suppression hearing did not 
established entrapment. 
Maddocks testified that when he first met defendant, he was smoking and 
selling methamphetamine, and admitted to manufacturing it. SH: 42. He testified 
that he saw a meth lab in defendant's house the first time he visited defendant there. 
SH: 15. Thus, even if Maddocks at some point provided defendant with iodine, it 
cannot be said that Maddocks entrapped him into manufacturing methamphe-
tamine. He was already doing so. "'[W]here it is known or suspected that a person 
is engaged in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not an entrapment to 
provide an opportunity for such person to carry out his criminal intentions.'" State 
v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, % 14,16 P.3d 1242 (citation omitted). 
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Moreover, the fact that Maddocks may have gained defendant's trust through 
their mutual membership in the Peckerwoods did not constitute entrapment. As 
recognized by this Court in Torres, informants "must have some means of gaining 
the trust of those involved in buying and selling drugs/' Id. at ^ 13. Where, as here, 
that mutual association is merely used to gain the trust of a dealer or manufacturer, 
there is no entrapment. See id. Contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the record 
suggests that Maddocks appealed to their association in the Peckerwoods to induce 
defendant to manufacture the drug. Nor did the record suggest that Maddocks 
appealed to sympathy or pity or made persistent pleas that defendant manufacture 
the methamphetamine. 
In sum, based on the foregoing facts, it cannot be said that defendant was 
entrapped as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant's final claim also fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between 
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 
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(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted October 20, 2005. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
- ^ — - ^ 
lelfrey S. Gray ^ 
^/Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 20,2005,1 served two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/ appellant, John Edwards, by causing them to 
be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
J. Bryan Jackson 
95 North Main St., Ste. 25 
P.O. Box 519 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0519 
F:\Jgray\Edwards\Edwards Joh brf.doc 
10/20/2005 11:14 PM 
Jeffrey S. Gray 
(Assistant Attorney Genera 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AM) FOR IRON COUNTY, ^ ' ^ ^ 
/OOHAPR 12 AM 8 = 3 8 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
 ?ni / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
Before the Honorable G. Michael Westfall, Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah: 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
That your affiant, Keith Millett, is the Commander of the Iron\Garfield Counties 
Narcotics Task Force (ICGNTF) and has been a peace officer for in excess of 14 years and has 
reason to believe the following, to wit: 
That within the residence known as the John Edwards residence, located at 364 lA South 
100 West, Cedar City, Utah, your affiant believes there is evidence of drug activity, including the 
manufacture of a controlled substance. Said residence is more particularly described as a white 
rambler style home with brown trim and an apartment downstairs wherein Mr. Edwards resides. 
The number 364 is affixed to the front of the home, which faces East and there is a large pine tree 
located in the front yard. Access to the basement apartment is on the south side of the residence 
with a set of stairs leading down to the door. A photograph of the home is attached hereto and 
incorporated by this reference. Next to the home is a white shed (the only shed on the premises). 
located on the north-west corner of the property in the back yard. John Edwards has access to 
store items in the shed pursuant to the lease agreement. Your affiant asserts that within the 
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Edwards residence and within the white shed to which Edwards has access and in Edward's 
vehicle, a grey 2000 Audi vehicle (License Plate # 054 MNZ), there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
The controlled substance methamphetamine, together with 
methamphetamine laboratory equipment (glassware, ephedrine, red 
phosphorous and iodine); and solvents and other chemicals used in 
the production of methamphetamine (coleman fuel, red-devil lye, 
and sulphuric acid); and records, notes, and papers related to the 
production or manufacturing of methamphetamine; and drug 
paraphernalia. 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being 
possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense, 
and/or consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the 
illegal conduct. 
I believe that the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and Unlawful 
Production\Manufacture of Methamphetamine, and that said offenses constitute felonies under 
the laws of the State of Utah. The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a search warrant 
are as follows: 
1. Commander Millett has been a peace officer in excess of fourteen years. He is 
currently assigned to the Iron/Garflied Narcotics Task Force and previously spent 
approximately 2 lA years with the task force from 1997-2000. Commander Millett 
has attended training classes related to the detection and investigation of narcotics 
and the production of methamphetamine. Commander Millett is a graduate of the 
United States Drug Enforcement Agency's school on clandestine laboratory 
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investigation and the Clandestine Laboratory Investigators Academy clandestine 
laboratory school. These two training academies teach, among other narcotics 
investigation skills, law enforcement agents to detect the ingredients, precursors, 
and "cooking" methods of manufacturing methamphetamine. Commander 
Millett, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and Commander with the 
Iron/Garfield Narcotics Task Force, has almost daily contact with 
methamphetamine, methamphetamine users, and/or methamphetamine laboratory 
equipment or supplies. 
2. Commander Millett has received information, from a confidential informant, that 
a methamphetamine lab is in operation at the John Edwards residence. The 
confidential informant has worked with the task force on previous occasions and 
has provided reliable information that led to the arrest of a particular suspect the 
task force had been monitoring. This arrest occurred in the latter part of 2003. 
Specifically, the confidential informant conducted two (2) "controlled buys" 
wherein the informant was wired with an electronic transmitting device and given 
task force buy money to complete the transactions. The informant arranged the 
transactions and then followed through under the surveillance and supervision of 
the task force agents. Each time the information provided by the informant 
proved reliable and methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect. 
3. The confidential informant asserts that he met John Edwards through other known 
drug users and has known Mr. Edwards for a couple of months. The informant 
asserts that he and Mr. Edwards are associated with a group called the 
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"Peckerwoods", a white supremacist group, and have built a relationship of trust 
through this association. 
4. The confidential informant has been reporting for approximately three (3) weeks 
that John Edwards is manufacturing methamphetamine from his apartment located 
at the address described above. The informant stated that the informant has 
viewed phosphorous, ephedrine, iodine, glassware and other items that are 
consistent with methamphetamine production. The informant stated that he has 
helped John Edwards weigh and package the finished product, methamphetamine, 
for sale and distribution. 
5. Today, April 7, 2004, at approximately 3:00 p.m. the informant stated that he was 
in the John Edwards residence and viewed John Edwards in the process of 
cooking methamphetamine. Specifically, the informant reported that Edwards 
was mixing chemicals (ephedrine, phosphorous, and iodine) in a flask which was 
sitting upon an electric burner. This information was received by your affiant at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. 
6. Your affiant asserts that John Edwards has the chemicals and laboratory 
equipment to produce the controlled substance, methamphetamine and that the 
above described actions are consistent with one in the process of producing 
methamphetamine. Further, your affiant asserts that Edwards was and still may be 
in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine based upon the information 
provided herein. Your affiant asserts that the process, depending upon the 
cooking method used, can take up to ten hours. The informant told your affiant 
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that it usually takes Mr. Edwards about ten hours to cook a batch of 
methamphetamine. 
7. The informant stated that Mr. Edwards uses the white shed behind the residence to 
store chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. In addition, the 
informant stated that Mr. Edwards will often leave his residence in a grey 2000 
Audi, registered to Natalie Muir (wife of John Edwards), with the finished 
product, methamphetamine. In your affiants training and experience with 
methamphetamine production and distribution it is common for suspects to store 
chemicals and laboratory equipment along with finished product in storage sheds 
and vehicles. 
8. Your affiant requests that this warrant be authorized for nighttime service as your 
affiant would like to search the residence prior to the cooking process being 
completed. In addition, the finished product could be moved away from the 
residence prior to your affiant being able to serve the warrant should the warrant 
be authorized for daytime service only. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said 
items set forth herein and located within the John Edwards residence, the above-described white 
storage shed, and the grey 2000 Audi vehicle located in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah, 
and being more particularly described herein. 
Your affiant further requests that said Search Warrant be served, in daytime or nighttime 
with the requirement that law enforcement officers knock or announce their presence prior to 
serving the Search Warrant. 
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Dated this ^ day of April, 2004 
Commander Keith Milfett, affiant 
Iron Garfield County Task Force 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 day of April, 2004 at the hour of ? - ^ I 
p.m. 
'G. Micha^%o#all 
District Court Judge 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
SCOTT GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Fax: (435) 586-2737 
DEC 2 8 2004 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN EDWARDS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR LIMIT 
Criminal No. 041500206 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on December 10,2004, for purposes 
of a suppression hearing, and both parties having submitted briefs on the suppression issues, and the 
Court having listened to testimony from witnesses for both parties, and oral argument having been 
made, and the matter having been submitted to the Court, the Court now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the defense has the burden of establishing that the confidential 
informant was acting as a government agent. 
2. The Court finds that the defense has not presented sufficient evidence to believe that 
the confidential informant was acting as a government agent. 
3. The Court finds that the confidential informant was not a government agent but, 
rather, was a private citizen for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
4. The Court finds that because the confidential informant was not acting as a 
government agent during the contested search on April 7, 2004, the Fourth Amendment has nof 
application to that search, and, therefore, the search was not illegal or invalid. 
5. The Court finds that there were three deficiencies in the search warrant presented for 
the judge's signature on April 7, 2004, to wit: 
A. The search warrant indicated that the confidential informant had conducted 
two (2) previous controlled buys with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force. However, 
the Court only heard testimony regarding one (1) previous controlled buy by the confidential 
informant. 
B. The search warrant failed to indicate why the confidential informant was 
cooperating with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force or what promises had been made 
to the confidential informant in exchange for his assistance. The Court finds that the confidential 
informant was promised that, in exchange for information regarding substance abuse in Iron County, 
the confidential informant may have a probation violation dismissed against him. 
C. The search warrant failed to mention any independent surveillance that had 
been done by Commander Keith Millett to corroborate the confidential informant's information 
about the Defendant conducting a methamphetamine lab in his residence. 
6. The Court finds that the deficiencies in the search warrant would not have changed 
the Court's decision in finding probable cause to conduct the search. Therefore, the Court finds that 
the search warrant ultimately obtained by the Task Force on April 7, 2004, is valid and upheld. 
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7. The Court finds that there was sufficient corroboration by the confidential informant 
and law enforcement to uphold the search warrant. Specifically, the confidential informant and 
Commander Millett had several conversations in the three (3) weeks prior to the date that the 
Defendant was arrested. The Court finds that, during that time, the confidential informant kept 
Commander Millett apprised of the Defendant's activities and the fact that he had laboratory 
equipment in his home and was in the process of preparing to cook methamphetamine. 
8. Additionally, the Court finds substantial corroboration for the search warrant as it 
relates to the issue of reliability contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the search warrant. The Court 
finds that the confidential informant had previously participated in a controlled buy with the Task 
Force which resulted in the arrest and prosecution of a particular defendant. 
9. The Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the Defendant was entrapped in this 
particular case. However, the Court does find that there is sufficient evidence to allow the issue of 
entrapment to be presented to the jury in the form of a jury instruction. 
ORDER 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following order: 
1. The confidential informant was not acting as a government agent during his entry of 
the Defendant's residence on April 7, 2004, and, therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
2. Despite certain deficiencies in the search warrant, those deficiencies were incidental 
and would not have changed the Court's decision as to probable cause; therefore, the search warrant 
is valid and upheld. 
3. The Defendant was not entrapped into committing this offense as a matter of law. 
However, enough evidence exists to allow the Defendant to present the issue of entrapment to a jury 
as a defense. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit is denied. 
DATED this . day of December, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
* **»» "«
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/G/klfaimL WESTFALLa-v 
District Court Ju&gs 
CERTIFIC F HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
£~*~ day of December, 2004, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for SUPPRESS OR LIMIT, on this. 
Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97 North Main Street, Suite 1, Cedar City, Utah 
84720. 
#ft 0J^7 _ 
Assistant 
